★★★★★ 5
When and where economics went wrong
Format: Paperback
This is one of those books that can provide an epiphany to the reader -- but not very many American readers have even heard of it, unfortunately. That could be due to it's being a book primarily about English economic history, with assumptions that the reader is familiar to some extent with things like the Poor Laws and Tory socialism. But I wasn't, and was still able to glean some great insights from the work. That could be because Polanyi is not afraid of repetition. :-)
A key insight, and the one that could be summed up as the theme of the book, is Polanyi's realization that prior to about 1830, the market and the economy were considered part of society. That is, economic activity was something that people did along with everything else they did, like engage in social/familial relationships, religious rituals, etc. But with the 1830s came a paradigm shift: the advent of rational capitalism. Now, the market was considered an entity by itself, outside of society. This market entity was viewed as governed by universal laws. Like laws of physics, these market laws were independent of culture, independent of social group, independent of time period, and, in fact, independent of human behavior. While any observer of human nature would say that people often make decisions for emotional reasons -- and modern neurological research shows that virtually every decision we make is a combination of the rational and the emotional -- these market laws assumed only rational behavior on the part of economic actors.
Though Polanyi doesn't mention it, it's now easy to see how Alfred Marshall could get carried away with creating a mathematical foundation for microeconomics and how Leon Walras could, reportedly, say that if something couldn't be studied mathematically, it wasn't worth studying. There's no current way to model emotions with math, and so the Ricardian prototype of an emotion-less economics continues into the modern economics of today.
These universal market laws frees the market from any social constraints. A number of modern neo-classical economists assert that this makes economics purely amoral, i.e., without regard for any ethics. Therefore any attempts by the public, by politicians, or by workers to add ethics to the market is an interference with pure market workings, which, according to their interpretation of Adam Smith's "invisible hand", will produce optimal results if just left alone. But Smith never said that, and in fact rational capitalism, in elevating greed and selfishness to the status of goals -- see the Ayn Rand work "The Virtue Of Selfishness" -- is, IMO, not amoral at all, but rather is a morality of its own.
Anyway, back to Polanyi's insights. Another key one is the concept of a "double movement" in 19th century England. Each move to create a purer market created an ad-hoc counter move. E.g., Ricardian free trade was faced with opposition from workers losing their jobs and local firms losing business Americans can easily think of another example: where the employment of children (eventually) led to laws restricting that employment, simply because human beings have too much of a sympathetic nature to sit still for children losing limbs in the dangerous factories and mines of the time. Polanyi notes that capitalists often blame these anti-capitalist laws on planned activity by socialist anti-market groups, but he says they're actually the result of the recognition by the general public that they don't want to live under a pure market system.
Yet another good insight is Polanyi's recognition that market laws treat labor, land, and money as commodities. We can see that today, where neo-classical economists assert that the law of supply and demand should apply to workers as it applies to anything else in the economy. That is, if there's a surplus of workers in one area and a shortage in another, supply and demand dictates the flow of workers from the one area to the other. But a laid-off textile worker in South Carolina is not going to move to China for a job. That's my own example, but Polanyi offers his own from modern English history.
The book isn't perfect. Polanyi does have a tendency to generalize, a common failing among authors, IMO. E.g., in discussing the rise of fascism in the 1930s, he's on very shaky ground when he starts talking about the US or about Russian policy intentions during that period.
I gave The Great Transformation 5 stars because, even with its faults, the reader will be thinking about Polanyi's insights for some time to come. I am.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2009
